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The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise of
opportunity, prosperity, and growth. The Project’s economic
strategy reflects a judgment that long-term prosperity is best
achieved by making economic growth broad-based, by
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a
role for effective government in making needed public
investments. Our strategy—strikingly different from the
theories driving economic policy in recent years—calls for fiscal
discipline and for increased public investment in key growthenhancing areas. The Project will put forward innovative
policy ideas from leading economic thinkers throughout the
United States—ideas based on experience and evidence, not
ideology and doctrine—to introduce new, sometimes
controversial, policy options into the national debate with
the goal of improving our country’s economic policy.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the
nation’s first treasury secretary, who laid the foundation
for the modern American economy. Consistent with the
guiding principles of the Project, Hamilton stood for sound
fiscal policy, believed that broad-based opportunity for
advancement would drive American economic growth, and
recognized that “prudent aids and encouragements on the
part of government” are necessary to enhance and guide
market forces.
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Abstract
The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive
action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that
caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological
and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain. While
the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans
that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers
took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper develops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between
individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies
within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction.
Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lenders would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt
out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would
face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions.

Copyright © 2008 The Brookings Institution
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1. Introduction

T

he housing crisis that we face today, driven
by serious problems in the subprime and alternative home mortgage-lending markets—
problems now spreading to the prime mortgage
market and beyond—suggests that our system of
home mortgage regulation is seriously deficient
and must be reformed. Many market-based systems
designed to ensure sound practices in this sector,
such as broker reputational risk, lender oversight of
brokers, investor oversight of lenders, rating agency
oversight of securitizations, and so on, simply did
not work. Conflicts of interest, inadequate capital
rules, lax regulation of key players, and boom times
covered up the abuses—at least for a while, at least
for those not directly affected. But no more.
We argue that we should take this opportunity to
implement common-sense reforms to the mortgage
market, to reduce the likelihood that such a crisis
will occur again. Some change is already occurring.
Market participants have been adjusting their policies. The Federal Reserve and the administration
have pursued monetary and fiscal levers and have
taken unprecedented steps to take over, bail out, or
shore up private financial institutions. The FDIC
has led the way with innovative reforms in banking
supervisory policies, and the Federal Reserve has
recently revamped its disclosure rules. Congress
has passed important legislation to help provide another option for the refinancing of defaulting mortgages and to help communities with the fallout.
But the fundamental problems that caused this crisis remain largely unaddressed by these measures,
which are largely focused on containing the current
crisis. The central features of the industrial organization of the mortgage market with its misaligned
incentives, the core psychological biases that drive
household decisionmaking, and the constrained
regulatory choice set available to policymakers all
remain. While the causes of the mortgage crisis are
myriad and the solutions to the crisis likely to be

multifaceted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that
looked much less expensive and much less risky
than they really were, in part because of low initial
monthly payments and hidden costly features. As
our friend Ned Gramlich once put it, “Why are the
most risky loan products sold to the least sophisticated borrowers?” (Gramlich 2007, p. 11). And
homeowners took those loans, with grave personal
and national consequences.
Choosing a mortgage is one of the largest financial decisions an American consumer will make, yet
it can be a complicated one, especially today, with
mortgages that vary in dimensions and unique features. This complexity has raised regulatory issues.
Should some features be regulated? Should product
disclosure be regulated? And most basic of all, is
there a rationale for regulation or will the market
solve the current crisis and provide the basis for
sound lending in the future? Current regulation of
home mortgages is largely stuck in two competing
models—disclosure, and usury or product restrictions. The current crisis suggests that a different
approach might be warranted. This paper uses insights from both psychology and economics to construct a framework for understanding both models
and to suggest a fundamentally new perspective.
In response to the complexity of our financial system, there has been a long-running debate about the
appropriate role and form of consumer regulation,
largely revolving around two poles of thought: one
focused on disclosure, the other on product restrictions. Disclosure regulation, embodied in the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA), presumes one market failure: the market will fail to produce a clear and comparable disclosure of essential product information
needed by consumers. TILA potentially responds
to two concerns. First, firms will not reveal all information that borrowers should understand and
analyze to make determinations regarding taking
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out a loan. Second, firms will not reveal information
in a way to facilitate comparability across products.
The first concern speaks to consumer knowledge,
solving the problem of inadequate information disclosure through the required provision of information; the second concern addresses consumers’ ability to process the information, solving the problem
of lack of comparability through coordination of
terms and definitions.
Though it presumes one form of market failure—
the lack of comparable and full disclosure—homo
economicus is very much the intellectual basis for
disclosure regulation: the model relies on fully rational agents who make intelligent choices. But empirical research on behavior, grounded in advances
in psychology, suggests that these neoclassical assumptions are misplaced and in many contexts consequential. In particular, the availability of data does
not always lead to communication and knowledge,
understanding and intention do not necessarily lead
to action, and contextual nuances can lead to poor
choices. Individuals consistently make choices that,
they themselves agree, diminish their own well-being in significant ways.
In contrast to disclosure regulation, usury laws and
product restrictions start from the idea that certain
prices or products are inherently unreasonable and
that consumers need to be protected from making
bad choices. Product regulation may diminish, in
some contexts, access to credit or may reduce innovation of financial products, however. Moreover, for
certain types of individuals some limitations may
themselves increase consumer confusion regarding
what rules apply to which products, and what products may prove beneficial or harmful. In addition,
firms will likely develop ways around such product
restrictions, undermining their core intention, increasing costs, and confusing consumers.
We explore a different approach, one based on insights from behavioral economics on the one hand
and an understanding of industrial organization on
the other. At the core of our analysis is the interaction between individual psychology and market
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competition. This view is in contrast to the classic
model, which relies on the interaction between rational choice and market competition. Because rational agents choose well, firms compete to provide
products that improve welfare. Because rational
agents process information well, firms compete to
provide information that improves decision quality.
By contrast, in our model individuals depart from
neoclassical assumptions in predictable ways. The
introduction of richer psychology complicates the
impact of competition: firms compete based on
how actual individuals will respond to products in
the marketplace, and actual competitive outcomes
may not always and in all contexts closely align with
increasing consumer welfare.
In the home mortgage market, the standard model
assumes that people evaluate options well and that
the more options people have, the better. Firms will
thus provide more options, people will pick the best
among them, and healthy competition will drive
out bad options. In reality, people are easily overwhelmed by too many options and make mistakes,
often in predictable ways. Borrowers, for example,
might pick the most salient dimension (lowest
monthly cost) rather than focusing on the longterm cost of credit—or on the fact that taxes and
insurance will not be escrowed and are not included
in the monthly cost. Consequently, firms can and
will introduce options that cater to these behaviors,
and people will pick options that carry a greater
likelihood of failure than anticipated, and which
they themselves would find suboptimal on further
reflection and analysis. These behavioral considerations suggest that disclosure of information alone
will often be insufficient to provide consumers with
what is needed to optimize their understanding, decisionmaking, and the resulting outcomes.
Our work is clearly related to the emerging literature on behaviorally informed policymaking. This
literature produces novel considerations in the design and implementation of regulation, including
features such as the framing of information, the setting of defaults or “opt-out” rules, the provision of
warnings, and other strategies to alter individual be-

A n O p t- O u t Hom e Mort ga g e S yst e m

havior.1 In this paper, we embed this thinking more
deeply in the logic of markets. Specifically, we adopt
a framework that takes into account firm incentives
to respond to behaviorally motivated regulation.
We envision outcomes as an equilibrium interaction between individuals with specific psychologies
and firms that respond to those psychologies within
specific market contexts. To the extent that the interactions produce outcomes that are not socially
optimal and produce real harms, regulation could
be devised to address failures in this equilibrium.
This perspective reveals two dimensions to consider. First, the psychological biases of individuals can
either help or hurt the firms with which they interact; hence firms’ and a publicly minded regulator’s
interests are sometimes aligned and sometimes not.
Let us take the example of a consumer who does not
understand the profound effects of the compounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual both to undersave and to overborrow. Society
would prefer that the individual did not have such a
bias in both contexts. Firms, however, would prefer
that the individual not have the bias to undersave
so that funds available for investment and fee generation would not diminish (abstracting from fee
structures). Under common real-world conditions,
however, firms would be perfectly content to see
the same individual overborrow (abstracting from
collection costs). Because people are fallible and
easily misled, transparency does not always pay off
and firms sometimes have strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases (see, e.g., Gabaix and
Laibson 2006). Regulation in this case faces a much
more difficult challenge than in the savings situation. The market response to individual failure can
profoundly affect regulation. In attempting to boost
participation in 401(k) retirement plans, the regula-

tor generally faces at worst indifferent and at best
positively inclined employers seeking to boost employee retention and to comply with federal pension rules.2 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of
credit, by contrast, the regulator often faces noncooperative firms whose interests are to find ways to
work around or to undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of
firms in particular markets interacting with individuals with specific psychologies is that the mode
of regulation chosen should take account of this
interaction. To explore this interaction, one might
think of the regulator as holding two different types
of levers: (1) changing the rules of the game, and
(2) changing the scoring.3 When forcing disclosure
of the APR, for example, the regulator effectively
changes one kind of rule of the game—what a firm
must say. A stronger form of rule change is product
regulation: changing what a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as creating a favored starting position or default, falls between these two types
of rule changes (disclosure and product regulation).
A default seeks to change what a firm does or says
by changing the starting position for the interaction between firms and individuals. Conversely,
when changing liability or providing tax incentives,
the regulator changes the way the game is scored.
Typically, changing the rules of the game (without
changing the scoring, as through liability changes)
maintains the firms’ original incentives to help or
hurt consumers based on their biases, channeling
the incentive into different behaviors by firms or
individuals, whereas changing the scoring of the
game can alter those incentives.
This perspective highlights the care that must be
taken when transferring the insights of prominent

1.	These strategies have been called variously asymmetric paternalism, libertarian paternalism, and debiasing through law. See, e.g., Camerer,
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Jolls and Sunstein (2005).
2.	We recognize that there are significant compliance issues regarding pensions and retirement plans, disclosure failures, fee churning, and
complicated and costly fee structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as problems with encouraging employers to
sign up low-wage workers for retirement plans. We do not mean to suggest that these failings are trivial—far from it. We only mean
to suggest that, as a comparative matter, market incentives to overcome psychological biases in order to encourage saving are more
aligned with optimal social policy than with market incentives to exacerbate psychological biases to encourage borrowing.
3.	We use this bimodal framework of regulatory choice to simplify the exploration of how our model of individual psychology and firm
incentives affects regulation. We acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more complex (see Barr 2005b).

w w w.hamiltonproject.org   |    S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8



An Opt-Out H ome Mortg age System

behavioral regulatory successes, such as defaults in
401(k) participation, to other domains that might
differ in nuanced but policy-relevant ways. In contrast to classical analyses, which impute substantial
planning and control to individuals, numerous studies of savings among middle-class households have
shown that savings works best as a default. Madrian
and Shea (2001), for example, studied several plans
that changed the default so that employees who fail
to take action are automatically enrolled into the retirement savings plan. They consistently found that
saving for retirement increased dramatically as the
default was changed to automatic enrollment. In a
similar vein, Thaler and Benartzi (2004) document
increased savings as a result of agreeing to default
deductions from future raises.
According to the present analysis, changing the
rules on retirement saving (by introducing defaults)
works well because employers’ incentives align (or
do not misalign) with regulatory efforts to guide
individual choice. In other words, under current
conditions employers are either unaffected or may
even be hurt by individuals’ propensity to undersave
in 401(k) plans.4 They thus will not lean against an
attempt to fix that problem (undersaving). In other
applications, such as where firms’ incentives misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules
alone may not work well since firms may have the
ability to work creatively around those rule changes
and seek to exploit individual biases in new ways. In
such circumstances, liability rules may need to be altered as well. Interestingly, such circumstances may
lead to regulations that, though deeply motivated
by behavioral insights, are not themselves particularly psychological in nature.
In the next section, we discuss disclosure and product regulation, which are the two dominant models
of consumer protection in credit markets. We then
explore behavioral insights that suggest the fragility

of relying on the rational actor model to develop
policy and discuss the realities of industrial organization of the home mortgage market that constrain
policymakers. In that discussion, we develop our
equilibrium model of human behavior and market
reaction and analyze the implications of that model
for regulatory choice. Finally, we introduce our alternative: behaviorally informed home mortgage
regulation. We then illustrate this approach with a
proposal for a sticky opt-out home mortgage system.
In brief, under our proposal lenders would be required to offer eligible borrowers a standard mortgage (or set of mortgages) such as a fixed-rate
self-amortizing thirty-year mortgage according to
reasonable underwriting standards. Lenders would
be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted
on the loan, and, subject to the constraints outlined
below, could offer whatever other loan products
they wanted to offer. Borrowers would receive the
standard mortgages offered unless they chose to
opt out in favor of another option, after the lender’s honest and comprehensible disclosures about
the risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out
mortgage system would mean borrowers would be
more likely to receive straightforward loans they
could understand.
But an opt-out policy on its own is likely to be inadequate because firms often have an incentive to hide
the true costs of borrowing. Given the strong market pressures to deviate from the default offer, we
would need to require more than a simple opt out
to make the default sticky enough to make a difference in outcomes. Thus, we propose that deviation
from the offer would require heightened disclosures
and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to
make the default sticky. Lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful disclosures to
those whom they convince to opt out because they

4.	This negative effect on employers when workers undersave largely occurs because of the existing regulatory framework: pension regulation gives employers incentives to enroll lower-income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent this, it is likely that firms would be happy
to discourage enrollment since they often must pay the match for these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests that even
defaults in savings only work because some other regulation changed the scoring of the game.
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would face heightened regulatory scrutiny, as well
as increased costs if the loans did not work out (that
is, if the borrower defaults on the loan).
Let us also say up front: the problem we identify
regarding lender incentives to take advantage of
consumer biases is not a specific function of the historical period leading up to the current crisis. Rather, it is a pervasive problem requiring a long-run
solution. In the current crisis, the perverse incentive we identify for firms to induce overborrowing
seems obvious, at least in retrospect, because loan
securitizations often left originators with no credit
risk. Going forward, the market will likely correct
this incentive problem and ensure originators are
left with credit risk. Even if such corrections occur, we outline below two reasons for further regulation. First, financial innovation is pervasive and
future innovations may generate different kinds of
incentive misalignment. Market generated incentive alignment is a particularly thin reed to build

a regulatory framework upon, particularly when,
as we show, plausible regulatory alternatives exist
that provide a safety net when incentives are not
perfectly aligned. Second, while the popular focus
has been on defaults, they are not the only measure
of bad outcomes for borrowers, or for society. Incentive alignment only guarantees that lenders internalize the cost of defaults. Nothing prevents the
market from offering products in which households
overborrow.5 For example, a household struggling
to make ends meet with excessive debt, but making
it, may suffer hidden costs of borrowing—such as
foregoing retirement or college savings—will not
be internalized by lenders. Moreover, a borrower
over-indebted on her mortgage might default on
her credit card debt, imposing costs on other lenders rather than on the mortgage originator. Thus,
our proposal continues to be relevant even if the
market has learned its lessons from the recent crisis.

5.	The key here is the possibility that consumers can make bad choices. In a rational model, consumers would not overborrow in a way that
hurts them. In a behavioral model, they can, and regulation (such as what we propose) may be needed to prevent such mistakes if they are
pervasive and serious enough, and cause widespread harm.
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2. The Existing Structure of Home Mortgage Credit Market
Regulation

E

xisting home mortgage regulation generally
encompasses disclosure regulation and product regulation models. Both models overlook
the interaction between individual psychology and
market structure.

Consumer-Oriented Disclosure Regimes
Consumer-oriented disclosures are designed to improve consumers’ ability to shop for products and
services. The theory is that information in credit
markets is imperfect, firms lack sufficient incentives
to coordinate to reveal comparable information, and
disclosures lower the cost of acquiring more information. More information, if comparable, should
help consumers negotiate better. This in turn leads
to more competition and a more efficient market.
TILA embodies this approach. Under TILA, creditors must reveal in a conspicuous and clear manner
the APR and other key costs of credit.
Two essential problems emerge with consumeroriented disclosure regimes such as TILA. First,
behavioral research teaches the pitfalls of relying
on consumer understanding to influence consumer
behavior; second, many transactions in the financial marketplace involve both complicated legal
rules and complicated product structures that even
financially sophisticated parties do not fully understand. Empirical evidence suggests that consumers
have a hard time understanding credit disclosures,
and research in behavioral economics confirms that
often consumers do not act on available information (see, for example, Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir,

Vermeulen and Wrobel 2008). If consumers are unlikely to understand a financial transaction and in
many cases are unlikely to behave fully rationally
even in the face of disclosed information, then relying on disclosure alone to address information
asymmetries may be an ineffectual response. Still,
disclosure might be improved based on behavioral
research (e.g., Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1211, 1230–
37; Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998).
TILA requires disclosures to consumers regarding
the cost of loans.6 This type of disclosure seeks to
remedy asymmetric information and improve market competition and efficiency through price disclosure, which would make it easier to comparison
shop.7 TILA disclosure most likely improves transparency and thus efficiency in the market, even if not
all consumers understand the disclosures (Schwartz
and Wilde 1979, p. 630). Yet we should be concerned
not only with an efficient market in the aggregate,
but also with efficiency within markets serving lowand moderate-income households and with the
consequences of inadequate disclosures for affected
consumers. Although TILA facilitates consumer
comparison shopping, in some cases too much information is given to consumers and in other cases
too little. Even outside the subprime market, there
is little reason to think that consumers understand
most aspects of mortgage transactions.8 Decision
research suggests a need for simplicity: individuals
faced with complex problems often simplify them
to one or two basic decisions (e.g., Baron 2000, pp.
43–68; Hogarth 1980, pp. 4–6; Plous 1993, pp. 107–
88). The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with

6. See, for example, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.17 (2001).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000), which states “The Congress finds that . . . competition among the various financial institutions and
other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened through informed use of credit. [Furthermore, i]t
is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him.” See also Engel and McCoy (2002, pp. 1255, 1280–81), who describe
opportunities that information asymmetries provide for predatory lenders and brokers. See also Schwartz and Wilde (1979, pp.
630, 635).
8. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (1998), which notes
consumers’ difficulties in understanding mortgage terms with or without disclosure.

10
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the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures
that permit consumers to comparison shop based
on the real price of multiattribute loans.
In addition, borrowers may trust mortgage brokers to give them full and accurate information
and to offer them the best loan product. Yet it is
in the broker’s interest to offer the borrower the
highest-rate loan that the broker can convince
the borrower to accept. Brokers earn higher-yield
spread premiums for placing borrowers into moreexpensive loans even if the borrower qualifies for
a lower-cost alternative. Even in competitive retail consumer markets for simple products, price
dispersion can persist (Carlton and Perloff 2000,
pp. 437–41). In home mortgage transactions, borrower understanding of complicated terms is likely
to be much lower, so price dispersion is likely to
be higher, than in markets for simple products.
Transactions for home mortgages present an even
greater possibility for price differentials based on
race, sophistication, ability to shop for better terms,
or other factors (Jackson and Burlingame 2007, p.
63).9 Moreover, with credit scoring, creditors know
whether borrowers qualify for less-expensive loans
under the lenders’ pricing schedules, but most borrowers do not realize that they so qualify.10
Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily complex.11
The efficacy of disclosures is diminished by inadequacies in the nature and timing of disclosures,
their limited effect on consumer behavior, and consumers’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral limitations (Eskridge 1984, pp. 1128–30). In fact, TILA
disclosures may not actually be noticed, read, or
understood (Renuart 2003, pp. 421, 432), and may
inundate the consumer with too much information
to process (Eskridge, pp. 1133–35; Landers and
Rohner 1979, pp. 722–25). Moreover, low-income
and minority buyers are the least likely to shop

for alternative financing arrangements. As a result,
these problems regarding the efficacy of disclosure
are likely exacerbated in the subprime market (e.g.,
Hogarth and Lee 2000).
TILA plays an important role in improving credit
markets, and reforms would most likely contribute
to improvements in credit markets. The current
structure of the home mortgage market, however—
at least for those borrowing from subprime lenders—suggests that disclosure will not be enough.
In addition, financial education can play a role in
helping consumers understand disclosures better,
but expenditures for financial education lead to
strong externalities. As a result, it is quite difficult
to induce private market participants to offer financial education to the borrowing public at anything
close to the scale it would take to make a difference.
Furthermore, most empirical research on financial
education concludes that its effect on real outcomes
is typically quite modest (Caskey 2006). This may
be caused at least in part by a behavioral tension,
pitting intention against action, which we discuss
below in the section on psychology and industrial
organization.

Product Regulation
Alongside disclosure, governments historically have
delineated the terms and conditions of some financial service products. Usury laws are the most common form of such restrictions. In economic terms,
one might argue in favor of usury laws to block the
granting of credit at high interest rates because the
implied default rates would pose unacceptable social externalities. The concern with usury laws is
that they often result in credit constraints on poor
(or even middle-income) households that could
otherwise afford and benefit from credit. Usury
laws may also drive lending underground to loan

9. Ayres (2001, pp. 19–44) has documented similar price discrimination in automobile sales and other markets.
10. Credit reports and credit scores are now available to borrowers on request. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub.
L. 108-159, §§ 211–12, 117 Stat. 1952, (2003): 1968–69, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. (2003), § 1681.
11. See, for example, Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), which describes the ineffectiveness of TILA in
conveying relevant information and concludes, “so much for the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers.” See also Durkin
(2002, pp. 201, 208, and Table 9), which found that 75 percent of respondents agreed either somewhat or strongly that TILA credit card
disclosures are complicated.
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sharks, precluding the possibility of effective consumer protection regulation.
Another type of product regulation excludes certain types of loan terms or sales practices. Such
restrictions often have two intertwined motivations. On the one hand, restrictions on loan terms
can enhance price disclosure and competition by
focusing borrowers and creditors on the price of
credit rather than on other features of the loan that
consumers may ill understand. On the other hand,
product restrictions may be thought of as a substantive judgment that certain loan terms are inherently
unreasonable. In either event, product restrictions
are based on the notion that consumers cannot fully
understand or act in their own best interests in the
face of confusing terms or transactions, or of deceptive sales practices to promote these unreasonable
terms. Moreover, in this view competition alone is
insufficient to drive out such practices.
For example, Congress enacted the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994 to respond to unscrupulous lending practices in the subprime home equity mortgage market.12 For some
high-cost loans, HOEPA imposes restrictions on
certain contract provisions, requires enhanced disclosures, and enhances remedies for violations. In
addition to product regulation, HOEPA requires,
directly and indirectly, enhanced disclosures for
borrowers facing high-cost loans. Directly, HOEPA enhances disclosure by requiring creditors
to disclose mortgage terms three days before closing. Indirectly, HOEPA product restrictions ought
to drive more of the cost of the loan into the APR
because lenders cannot use the prohibited mortgage terms to cover costs. With more of the cost
of the mortgage reflected in the APR, it should be
easier for consumers to understand the costs of the

loan and to comparison shop effectively. Creditors
would then tend to compete more on price and less
on other factors, factors that consumers have difficulty evaluating. Product regulation could then,
under some circumstances, enhance the effectiveness of disclosure regimes.
HOEPA, however, is decidedly underinclusive: it is
designed to curb abusive practices at the fringe of
lending rather than to overcome broader failures.
Moreover, as a practical matter HOEPA’s record
has been mixed at best (e.g., HUD-Treasury 2000).
In response, in June 2000 a HUD-Treasury report
proposed a four-part approach to curbing predatory lending (Barr 2005a; HUD-Treasury). Quite
recently, the Federal Reserve Board unveiled major changes to its HOEPA and TILA rules.13 Many
other improvements to abusive practice regulation
are desirable and may now be forthcoming given
the fallout from the subprime mortgage-lending
crisis. Congress is currently considering antipredatory lending legislation.14
In addition to the federal regulatory landscape,
many states have passed new antipredatory lending
laws or have enhanced existing laws (Bostic, Engel,
McCoy, Pennington-Cross, and Wachter 2007; Ho
and Pennington-Cross 2006; Li and Ernst 2006).
Many of these laws are modeled on the federal
HOEPA legislation but increase coverage, enhance
restrictions, or bolster enforcement (Bostic et al.
2007). A vigorous debate exists about whether these
state laws diminish access to credit and harm consumers, or whether these laws diminish access to
credit that ought not to be provided, and thus increase consumer welfare. Bostic and his colleagues
find that the broader coverage of these laws tends
to increase subprime origination but that increased
restrictions and enforcement tend to diminish such

12. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994): codified at 15 U.S.C. (2000), §
1601.
13.	See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226 (July 14, 2008); “Summary of Findings: Consumer Testing of Mortgage Broker Disclosures,” submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 10, 2008; Federal Reserve
Board, “Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z,” 12 CFR Part 226 (June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, No. 114: 32948; “Design and
Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures,” submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 16, 2007).
14.	See, for example, Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong., 1st sess.

12

THE HAMILTON PROJECT    |   the broo king s institution

A n O p t- O u t Hom e Mort ga g e S yst e m

originations. The empirical debate about the scope
and effectiveness of these provisions is likely to
continue.
In principle, overly prescriptive product regulations can diminish financial access and harm product competition and innovation that might serve
low-income households. Governments may easily
err by restricting products that would be advantageous or by creating consumer confusion through
complicated rules regarding product regulation. Financial markets change rapidly and firms can easily

innovate in ways that are not anticipated by government regulators. Such innovations could serve
consumers better than do government-imposed
product regulations. Conversely, such innovations
could help firms evade government regulations to
the detriment of consumers. It is difficult to know
in advance how market innovations will interrelate
with product regulations, but for many reasons government regulators may not be able to keep up with
these changes. The trade-offs inherent in product
regulation should be considered, as should alternative forms of regulation.
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3. Psychology and Industrial Organization

W

ith the background on home mortgage
regulation established, we turn next to
the particular dynamic between individual behavior and industrial organization in that
market. Recent behavioral research promises to
enrich our understanding of the tensions outlined
above by providing a more-nuanced and faithful
rendition of the psychological and organizational
facts that characterize people’s relevant behaviors.
We first consider some of the major behavioral
insights. We then briefly discuss the promise of
behavioral regulation and the limitations of behavioral regulation that does not take account of
market structure. Next, we turn to the industrial
organization of the mortgage market as it relates
to behavioral patterns. We develop a model of the
interaction between individual psychology and industrial organization and illustrate how it should
affect regulatory choice.

A Deeper Look at Insights from
Behavioral Research
How firms will respond to regulation is bound to
depend on people’s perceptions and behaviors to
which firms respond in their marketing and in the
products and services they offer. Understanding
people’s behaviors promises to give a clearer picture
of the contour of market forces and of the problems
regulation is attempting to solve.
Behavioral research paints a quite different picture
of the average citizen from the picture typically envisioned in economic policy circles, with significant
implications for policy design and implementation.
The classical, rational agent model assumes actors with well-ordered preferences and calibrated
judgments who are well informed, maximize their
self-interested well-being via tangible rewards, and
make coherent and insightful plans, which they
pursue with efficiency and self-control. In contrast,
behavioral research finds people are quite differ-
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ent: their preferences are malleable, their judgment prone to predictable heuristics and biases,
their interests often neither selfish nor material,
and their plans and behaviors often more context
dependent than planned and calculating. What is
notable about the emerging behavioral picture is
that it paints people as not merely confused and error prone, but also as driven by tendencies that are
systematic and predictable yet profoundly different from those typically envisioned by the rational
model. A better understanding of such tendencies,
appropriately applied, promises to yield policies that
are more successful. In the words of John Maurice
Clark almost a hundred years ago, “The economist
[policy analyst] may attempt to ignore psychology,
but it is sheer impossibility for him to ignore human nature. . . . If the economist [policy analyst]
borrows his conception of man from the psychologist, his constructive work may have some chance
of remaining purely economic in character. But if
he does not, he will not thereby avoid psychology.
Rather, he will force himself to make his own, and
it will be bad psychology” (Clark 1918).
Consider, for example, such central notions as decisional conflict, information, learning, and planning. Each plays an important role in behavior but
deviates in important ways from what is typically
assumed by the normative account. Understanding
these notions and how individual actions can differ
from what is typically assumed is necessary in order
to craft effective policy. In what follows, we address
these notions in subsections that focus on decisional
conflict, the role of contextual factors, knowledge,
and attention, and what social psychologists call
“channel factors.”
Decisional Conflict
People’s preferences are typically constructed, not
merely revealed, during the decisionmaking process; the construction of preferences is influenced
by the nature and the context of decision, with im-
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portant implications. Consider, for example, the
role of decisional conflict. Because preferences need
to be constructed, choices can be hard to make.
People often look for a good reason, a compelling
rationale, for choosing one option over another. At
times, compelling rationales are easy to find and articulate; at other times, no easy rationale presents
itself, which can make the conflict between options hard to resolve. Decisional conflict can prove
aversive and can lead people to postpone decisions
or to opt for a default option, generating preference patterns that are fundamentally different from
those predicted by classical accounts based on value
maximization.
According to the classical analysis, each option is
assigned a subjective value or utility and the decisionmaker chooses the option assigned the highest
utility. Such analysis does not anticipate decisional
conflict and assumes that having more alternatives
is a good thing since the more options there are, the
more likely the consumer is to find one that satisfies
her utility function.
Instead, a proliferation of alternatives can dissuade
consumers from making the most favorable choice.
As choice becomes more difficult, decisions are deferred, often indefinitely (Iyengar and Lepper 2000;
Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Tversky and
Shafir 1992). This has been documented in decisions ranging from choosing jams in upscale grocery
stores (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) to applying for a
loan equal to roughly one-third of the applicant’s
income (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir,
and Zinman 2007) to participating in retirement
savings plans, which drops as the number of fund
options offered increases (Iyengar, Huberman, and
Jiang 2004). Furthermore, the tendency to refrain
from making a choice gives an uncanny advantage
to the default, or the perceived status quo. This has
been observed in several naturally occurring experiments. For example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
both introduced the option of a limited right to sue
in the context of insurance decisions, entitling automobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The two
states differed in what was offered as the default op-

tion: New Jersey motorists needed to acquire the
full right to sue (transaction costs were minimal:
a signature), whereas Pennsylvania motorists had
the full right to sue as the default, which could be
forfeited in favor of the limited alternative. Only
about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers chose to
acquire the full right to sue, whereas approximately
75 percent of Pennsylvania drivers chose to retain
it, which had substantial financial repercussions
(Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther
1993). A second naturally occurring experiment was
recently observed in Europeans’ decisions with regard to membership in organ donor pools (Johnson
and Goldstein 2003). In opt-out countries, drivers
are by default organ donors unless they elect not to
be; in opt-in countries they are by default not donors
unless they choose to be. Effective rates of participation in organ donor pools are almost 98 percent
in the former countries and about 15 percent in the
latter, a remarkable difference, given the low transaction costs and the significance of the decision.
Such patterns suggest that minor contextual changes can alter what consumers choose in ways that are
unlikely to relate to their ultimate utility. Of course,
the fact that consumers are influenced by conflict
and context need not immediately imply that choices ought to be taken away from them or even that
the number of available alternatives ought to be restricted. It does suggest, however, that a proliferation of alternatives needs to be considered with care
rather than seen as an obvious advantage. It also
suggests that the default outcome, which acquires
a privileged status by being the default—rather
than being a mere formality that can be effortlessly
changed—needs to be chosen thoughtfully. In effect, when a large array of options, including the
option of choosing the status quo, are inappropriately handled (intentionally or not) substantial decrement in consumers’ welfare can result. A proliferation of complicated decisions in the mortgage
market, for example, can lead to quite bad outcomes
for borrowers.
Context Dependent Preferences
Individual preferences are significantly more com-
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plicated and local than the rational conception.
People often are weak at predicting their future
tastes or at learning from past experience (Kahneman 1994), and their choices can be influenced
by anticipated regret (Bell 1982), by costs already
incurred (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and
Soman 1998), and by effects of sequencing and
temporal separation where high-discount rates for
future as compared to present outcomes can yield
dynamically inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein
and Elster 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler 1989).
Contrary to standard assumptions, the psychological carriers of value are perceived gains and losses
and not anticipated final states of wealth, and attitudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aversion
in the face of gains to risk seeking what appear as
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Moreover,
people are loss averse—that is, they perceive that
the loss associated with giving up a good is substantially greater than the utility associated with
obtaining it (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). This,
in turn, leads to reluctance to depart from the status quo because things to be renounced are valued
more highly than comparable things to be gained
(Knetsch 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
People use intuitive mental accounting schemes in
which they compartmentalize wealth and spending into distinct budget categories such as savings,
rent, and entertainment, and into separate mental
accounts such as current income, assets, and future
income (Thaler 1985, 1992). Contrary to standard
fungibility assumptions, people exhibit different degrees of willingness to spend from various accounts,
yielding consumption patterns that are sensitive to
labels, overly dependent on current income, and
often problematic, such as saving at a low interest
rate while concurrently borrowing at a high rate
(Ausubel 1991).
Common to these patterns is the highly local and
context-dependent nature of consumer decisions.
Standard thinking envisions preferences that are
largely impervious to minor contextual nuances.
In contrast, people’s choices are heavily context dependent, with the option chosen not infrequently
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being one that would have been forgone had the
context differed by just a little, often in trivial ways.
What this means is that people’s choices are often
at the mercy of chance as well as of intentional manipulation. These choices merit careful consideration, particularly in contexts with potentially serious consequences.
Knowledge, Attention, and Intention
A standard assumption is that consumers are attentive, knowledgeable, and typically able to avail
themselves of important information. Instead, consumers across a wide range of income and education
levels are often ignorant of options, program rules,
benefits, and opportunities. Surveys show that fewer
than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds,
or other securities) can be considered financially
literate (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998); similar
findings describe the understanding shown by pension plan participants (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even
older beneficiaries often do not know what kind of
pension they are set to receive or what mix of stocks
and bonds they own.
Cognitive load, defined as the amount of information
attended to, has been shown to affect performance
in a variety of tasks. When consumers find themselves in situations that are unfamiliar, distracting,
tense, or even stigmatizing (such as applying for a
loan), all of which tend to consume cognitive and
emotional resources, fewer resources remain available to process information relevant to the decision
at hand. As a result, decisions may become even
more dependent on situational cues and irrelevant
considerations. This is observed, for example, in
studies of low-literacy consumers who apparently
struggle with trade-offs between effort and accuracy, are overly dependent on peripheral cues in product advertising and packaging, and show systematic
withdrawal from market interactions (Adkins and
Ozanne 2005).
More generally, information cannot be equated
with knowledge. People often do not fully process
imminently available data because of limitations in
attention, understanding, perceived relevance, or
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their ability to remember. Program designers often
do not appreciate this, having been trained to think
that people know what is important and knowable.
An important theme in behavioral research with
profound consequences for thinking about policy is
the systematic discrepancy between intention and
action, which is essentially assumed away in analyses
of rational behavior. Just because a person recognizes and has every intention of doing the right thing
often does not bring about the intended action.
Even when intentions are genuine and strong, selfcontrol problems, poor planning, lack of attention,
and forgetting can all intercede. On the flip side and
for similar reasons, actions may be taken that were
genuinely unintended, thus violating the notion of
revealed preference. A degree of self-knowledge, in
turn, leads people to take precautions against such
tendencies, which can lead to unintended consequences when policies are designed with different
creatures in mind.
Channel Factors
The pressures exerted by situational factors can constitute restraining forces that are hard to overcome
or can create inducing forces that can be harnessed
to great effect. In contrast with massive interventions that often prove ineffectual, seemingly minor
situational changes can have a large impact. Kurt
Lewin, who coined the term channel factors (Lewin
1951), suggests that certain behaviors can be facilitated by opening a channel, whereas other behaviors can be blocked by closing a channel. Leventhal,
Singer, and Jones (1965) document an illustrative
example of a channel factor: their subjects received
persuasive communications about the risks of tetanus and the value of inoculation and were then invited to go to the campus infirmary for a tetanus
shot. Follow-up surveys showed that the communication was effective in changing beliefs and attitudes.
Nonetheless, only 3 percent actually took the step
of getting themselves inoculated compared with 28
percent of those who received the same communication but also were given a map of the campus with
the infirmary circled and were urged to decide on a
particular time to go and a route to get them there.

Along these lines, Koehler and Poon (2005) argue
that people’s predictions of their future behavior
overweight the strength of their current intentions
and underweight contextual factors that influence
the likelihood that those intentions will translate
into action. This can generate systematically misguided plans among consumers who, reassured by
their good intentions, proceed to put themselves in
situations that are powerful enough to make them
act and choose otherwise.
Behavioral research highlights a simple fact that is
both terribly trivial and extremely profound: people choose between, act toward, and exercise judgment about things as they are mentally represented
and not about things as they are in the real world.
In addition, the relationship between extensional
outcome and internal representation is rarely one
to one. Instead, options are construed, elaborated
on, and contextually interpreted in ways that are
both systematic and consequential.
Framing, context effects, and channel factors are
some of the features of the construal process with
important policy implications. The take-up of a
program, for example, will depend on whether it
is construed as the default or as a departure from
the status quo, whether others are thought to have
adopted it, or whether it requires what is perceived
as a difficult choice from among an array of alternatives or, instead, it is perceived as an easy choice.

The Promise and Limitations of
Behavioral Regulation
Recent behavioral work, particularly in the area
of savings, has shown the promise of behaviorally
informed regulation—regulation that is motivated
directly by specific psychological insights, including
of the types discussed above. The research suggests
that individual choice can be profoundly affected by
psychological constructs such as mental accounting,
anchoring, endowment effects, and framing; these
constructs can make a big difference to outcomes.
Building on these insights, among other things, recent policy innovations have exploited the power of
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defaults in determining, for example, whether and
how much individuals will save through contributions to 401(k) plans.
In a study of elective enrollment in one firm’s retirement plan (Madrian and Shea 2001), employees
who joined the firm had to fill out a form to participate in the savings plan. Although the plan was
quite lucrative, participation was low, and a simple
feature of the program was then changed: prior to
the change, the enrollment form required people to
opt-in (“Check this box if you would like to participate”). After the change, new employees received
a form that required of them to “Check this box if
you would like not to have 3 percent of your pay
check put into a 401(k) plan.” The effect of this nuanced manipulation was large. As the default option
changed from “no contribution” to “contribution,”
take-up rates increased from 38 to 86 percent. Several years later, those exposed to the contribution
default still showed higher contribution rates. More
and more employers have been adopting automatic
features, and the Pension Protection Act of 2006
includes a number of features specifically crafted to
encourage opt-out defaults in savings plans. If employers are required to enroll workers in automatic
retirement plans unless the worker affirmatively
opts out of participating, there is good reason to
expect enrollment rates to be higher and net savings
to increase.
Behavioral principles have figured prominently
in recent attempts at even more constructive savings applications. Save More Tomorrow (SMarT),
a program intended to increase retirement savings,
deposits money into savings out of future salary
raises rather than out of current income, with the
added proviso that one can withdraw from the program at any time. The program relies on basic behavioral regularities—future discounting, nominal
loss aversion, and status quo bias—to generate substantial increases in retirement savings. It has been
adopted by many employers, affecting the lives of
millions in the United States and abroad (Benartzi
and Thaler forthcoming; Iwry and John 2006; Thaler and Benartzi 2004).
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Similar types of policies can be pursued across a
range of financial products and services that reach
low-income households. By further extension from
the retirement literature, employers could be required to deposit workers’ income checks directly
into a low-cost bank account with an automatic savings plan unless the worker opts out of the arrangement. Governments could make tax refund and
benefit payments through direct deposit into a safe
and affordable bank account with savings features,
again unless the beneficiary opts out (Barr 2007).
Our starting point, however, is that opt-out rules
and other such examples may be limited in their
scope of application. Consider the common opt-out
experience of signing a rental car contract. Individuals actively opt out of many features of a rental contract but do so almost automatically when the agent
tells them to “Initial here, here, and here.” Although
opting out may be effective in the lack of a strong
market pressure, it is far too easily overcome by the
firm who interacts directly with the consumer. This
raises the more basic question, “What would behavioral regulation look like in a richer context, where
we consider the ability of the firm to respond to this
regulation, and potentially to undo or magnify it?”
To understand the interaction between behaviorally informed regulation and market forces, we turn
to industrial organization.

Industrial Organization: How Market
Forces Can Undermine or Reinforce
Behaviorally Informed Regulation
In theory, market forces help push private sector
actors to offer the best products at the lowest prices.
The theory, however, depends crucially on assumptions of rationality. In the classic economic model,
the setup is this: free competition for the provision
of goods and services to consumers who obtain full
information, understand the information they receive, and act based on that full information. Market actors are restrained from peddling welfare-reducing products by consumers who demand better.
In practice and in some contexts, as we have seen,
the market has produced products and services that
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are suboptimal. It is easier to see why market forces
sometimes may not produce optimal products and
services once one relaxes the assumptions underlying the classic model.

sometimes have strong incentives to exacerbate
psychological biases. Regulation in this case faces
a much more difficult challenge than in the savings
situation.

Returning to the opt-out regulation, the presumption is that individuals fail to maximize their own
utility because of temporal inconsistency—they
would like to save but fail to do so. Opt-out regulation eases this problem by facilitating savings even
among those who do nothing (perhaps because of
procrastination). What are firm (employer) incentives in this case? Employers appear to be largely
indifferent or perhaps even motivated to decrease
the bias against savings.15 This incentive is crucial.

This distinction in market responses to individual
psychology is central to our framework; it is illustrated in Table 1. In some cases, the market is either
neutral or wants to overcome consumer fallibility.
In other cases, the market would like to exploit or
exaggerate consumer fallibility. Thus, when consumers misunderstand compounding of interest
in the context of saving, banks have incentives to
reduce this misunderstanding so that they can increase their deposits. When consumers misunderstand compounding in the context of borrowing,
lenders have little incentive to remove this misunderstanding because it can only decrease the debts
they are able to issue.16 When consumers procrastinate in signing up for the EITC (and hence in filing their tax returns), private tax preparation firms
have incentives to help remove this procrastination
to increase their customer base. When consumers
procrastinate in sending in requests for rebates (but
make retail purchases as if they are going to receive
a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism in
these examples: firm incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are not an intrinsic feature of the bias
itself. Instead, they are a function of how the bias
plays itself out in the particular market structure.

But in some markets firms have incentives to confound consumers (Gabaix and Laibson 2006). In
posting prices, for example, firms have strong market and private incentives to hide certain prices. If
consumers are sorted into those who understand
complicated offers and those who do not, it is difficult for firms to compete by offering the most transparent products if such products are less profitable.
Consumers who understand bad deals already avoid
them and will shun the new offer; consumers who
do not understand them and go for the new, better offer will just lower profits for the firm (Gabaix
and Laibson 2006). This result—that transparency
does not always pay off for firms because people
are fallible and easily misled—illustrates how firms

15.	This is largely because of the existing regulatory framework—pension regulation gives employers at least some incentive to enroll lowerincome individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment because they often
must pay the match for these individuals. Even with the incentive, the pension structure creates far-from-perfect alignment of public and
private interests in enrolling workers. This point is interesting because it suggests that even defaults in savings work only because some
other regulation changed the scoring of the game.
16. This stylized example abstracts from collection issues.
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Table 1

The Firm and the Individual

Behavioral fallibility	Market neutral, or wants to 	Market exploits consumer fallibility
		
overcome consumer fallibility
Consumers misunderstand
Consumers misunderstand
Consumers misunderstand
compounding
compounding in savings.
compounding in borrowing.
		
➞ Banks would like to reduce
➞ Banks would like to exploit
			 this to increase savings base. 		 this to increase borrowing.
Consumers procrastinate
Consumers procrastinate
Consumers procrastinate
		
in signing up for EITC.
in sending in requests for rebates.
		
➞ Tax filing companies would
➞ Retailers would like to
			 like to reduce this to 		 exploit this to increase 		
			 increase customer base.		 revenues.
			

In the consumer credit market, one worries that
many firm-individual interactions are of the kind
where firms seek to exploit rather than to alleviate
bias. If true, this raises the concern of overextrapolating from the example of 401(k) defaults to credit
products. To the extent that 401(k) defaults work
because optimal behavior is largely aligned with
market incentives, other areas such as credit markets might be more difficult to regulate with mere
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated by low-road firms offering opaque products
that prey on human weakness, it is more likely that
regulators of such a market will be captured, that
market forces will defeat positive defaults sets, and
that low-road players will continue to dominate.
Many observers believe that the credit markets are,
in fact, currently dominated by such low-road firms
(e.g., Bar-Gill 2004; Mann 2007) and that players
that were formerly high-road players have come to
adopt the sharp practices of their low-road competitors. If government policymakers want to attempt
to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to
deploy stickier defaults or more-aggressive policy
options.

Table 2 illustrates a conceptual approach to the issue of regulatory choice. The regulator can either
change the rules of the game or change the scoring of the game. Setting a default is an example
of changing the rules of the game, as is disclosure
regulation. Specifically, the rules of the game are
changed when there’s an attempt to change the
nature of firm-individual interactions, as when the
regulation attempts to affect what can be said, offered, or done. Changing the scoring of the game,
by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive
for particular outcomes. Pension regulation that penalizes firms whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top
heavy with high-paid executives is an example of
how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll lowincome individuals without setting particular rules
on how this is done.

Table 2

Changing the Game

Rules

• Set the defaults in 401(k) savings
• Set the default for organ donation

Scoring
• Penalties for 401(k) enrollment that is
		 top heavy with high-salary employees
•	Grants to states that enroll organ 		
		 donors
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Table 3 weaves together these different dimensions,
illustrating how regulatory choice ought to be
analyzed according to the market’s stance toward
human fallibility. In what follows, we discuss the
specific application of these forces to the case of
mortgage markets with an example in the form of
an opt-out mortgage system. Among other things,
the discussion illustrates how policies in the topright-hand corner of Table 3 face a particular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone will
be difficult when firms are highly motivated to find
work-arounds. When we suggest below opt-out
policies in mortgages, the challenge will be to find
ways to make these starting positions sticky so that
firms do not simply undo their default nature. In
our judgment, both achieving a good default and
figuring out how to make it work requires separating low-road from high-road firms and making it
profitable for high-road firms to offer the default
product (for a related concept, see Kennedy 2005).
For that to work, the default must be sufficiently
attractive to consumers and sufficiently profitable
for high-road firms to succeed in offering it. In addition, penalties associated with deviations from
the default must be sufficiently costly to make the
default stick even in the face of market pressures
from low-road firms. It may be that in some credit
markets low-road firms have become so dominant
that sticky defaults will be ineffectual. Moreover,
achieving such a default is likely more costly than

making defaults work when market incentives align,
not least because the costs associated with the stickiness of the default involve dead-weight losses, given
that there will be those for whom deviating from the
default is optimal. These losses would need to be
weighed against the losses from the current system,
as well as against losses from alternative approaches
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, given the considerations above it seems worth
exploring whether such sticky defaults can help to
change the rules of the game.
The default example is just one of a set of examples we explore elsewhere as potential regulatory
interventions based on our conceptual framework.
As noted above, given market responses to relevant
psychological factors in different contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms. These forms
include some that, while informed by psychology,
are designed not to affect behavioral change but
rather to alter the structure of the market in which
relevant choices are made. Given the complexities
involved, the purpose of this paper is not to champion a specific opt-out mortgage policy. Instead, we
illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory
analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the
costs and benefits of specific policies. We explore
one idea to implement an opt-out mortgage policy
in order to illustrate our conceptual approach.

Table 3

Behaviorally Informed Regulation

Market neutral or wants to 	Market exploits consumer fallibility
overcome consumer fallibility
Rules

• Public education on saving
• Direct deposit or auto-save
• Licensing of brokers

• Opt-out mortgage system
• Information debiasing on debt through framing, salience

Scoring
• Tax incentives for savings vehicles
• Penalties to make the opt-out system sticky
		 for the poor
• Ex post liability standard for truth in lending
			
• Broker fiduciary duty, or changing compensation
				 (banning yield spread premiums)
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4. An Opt Out Mortgage Policy

W

hile the causes of the mortgage crisis are
myriad, a central problem is that many
borrowers took out loans that they did
not understand and could not afford. Brokers and
lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than they really were because of low initial monthly payments and hidden, costly features.
Families commonly make mistakes in taking out
home mortgages because they are misled by broker
sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated terms
and financial trade-offs in mortgages, wrongly
forecast their own behavior, and misperceive their
risks of borrowing. How many homeowners really
understand how the teaser rate, introductory rate,
and reset rate relate to the London interbank offered rate plus some specified margin, or can judge
whether the prepayment penalty will offset the
gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules
of the game of disclosure and altering the “scoring” for seeking to evade proper disclosure may
be sufficient to reduce the worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and consumer confusion
are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be
enough. If market complexity is sufficiently disruptive to consumer choice, product regulation might
prove most appropriate. For example, by barring
prepayment penalties, one could reduce lock-in to
bad mortgages; by barring short-term adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs) and balloon payments,
one could reduce refinance pressure. In both cases,
more of the cost of the loan would be pushed into
interest rates and competition could focus on price.
Price competition would benefit consumers, who
would be more likely to understand the terms on
which lenders are competing. Product regulation
would also reduce cognitive and emotional pressures related to potentially bad decisionmaking.
However, product regulation may stifle beneficial
innovation; there is always also the possibility that
government may simply get it wrong.

22

THE H AMILTON PROJECT    |   the broo king s institution

For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. For lack of a better term, we call this a sticky
opt-out mortgage system. As with opt-out regulation generally, a sticky opt out-system would fall, in
terms of stringency, somewhere between product
regulation and disclosure. For reasons we explain
below, however, market forces would likely swamp
a pure opt-out regime—that’s where the need for
stickiness comes in. We propose that a default be
established with increased liability exposure for deviations that harm consumers. This approach corresponds to a combination of changing the rules of
the game (top-right-hand corner of Table 3) and
changing liability rules (bottom-right-hand corner
of that table).
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model
of firm incentives and individual psychology. Borrowers may be unable to distinguish among complex loan products and may be unable to act optimally based on such an understanding (e.g., Ausubel
1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make
it easier for borrowers to choose a standard product and harder for them to choose a product that
they are less likely to understand. At the same time,
lenders may seek to extract surplus from borrowers
because of asymmetric information about future income or default probabilities (Musto 2007). In the
short term, lenders and brokers may benefit from
selling borrowers loans that they cannot afford.
Thus, as we outline next, a pure default would be
undermined by firms; regulation needs to take account of this market pressure.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer
eligible borrowers a standard mortgage or set of
mortgages, such as a fixed rate, self-amortizing,
thirty-year mortgage loan, according to reasonable
underwriting standards. The precise contours of
the standard set of mortgages would be set by regulation. Lenders would be free to charge whatever
interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, subject
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to the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other loan products they wanted outside of
the standard package. Borrowers, however, would
receive the standard mortgage offered, unless they
chose to opt out in favor of a nonstandard option
offered by the lender, after honest and comprehensible disclosures from brokers or lenders about the
risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out mortgage system would mean borrowers would be more
likely to receive straightforward loans they could
understand.
But a plain vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where market
incentives align well with policies to overcome behavioral biases, in the context of the credit markets
firms often have an incentive to hide the true costs
of borrowing. Given the strong market pressures
to deviate from the default offer, we would need
to require more than a simple opt out to make
the default sticky enough to make a difference in
outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require
heightened disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to make the default sticky.
Under our plan, lenders would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful disclosures to those
whom they convince to opt out because they would
face increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased costs
if the loans did not work out (for example, if the
borrower defaults on the loan and seeks bankruptcy
protection or the lender seeks foreclosure).
Future work will need to explore the enforcement
mechanism in detail. For example, under one potential approach to making the opt-out sticky, if default occurs when a borrower opts out the borrower
could raise the lack of reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy or foreclosure. Using an objective reasonableness standard akin to that used for
warranty analysis under the Uniform Commercial
Code, if the court determined that the disclosure
would not effectively communicate the key terms
and risks of the mortgage to the typical borrower,
the court could modify or rescind the loan contract.
Another alternative would be to have the banking
agencies (or another expert consumer agency) en-

force the requirement, rather than relying on the
courts to do so. The agency would be responsible
for supervising the nature of disclosures according
to a reasonableness standard and would impose
a fine on the lender and order corrective actions
if the disclosures were found to be unreasonable.
The precise nature of the stickiness required and
the trade-offs involved in imposing these costs on
lenders would need to be explored in greater detail,
but in principle a sticky opt-out policy could effectively leverage the behavioral insight that defaults
matter with the industrial organizational insight
that certain market incentives work against a pure
opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with stickiness might
provide several benefits over the current market outcomes. Under the plan, a plain vanilla set of default
mortgages with standard terms would be easier to
compare across mortgage offers. Information could
be more efficiently transmitted across the market.
Consumers are likely to understand the key terms
and features of such standard products better than
they would alternative mortgage products. Price
competition is more likely to be salient once features are standardized. Behaviorally, once the alternative products are introduced, the consumer will
be made aware that such alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping to anchor consumer
decisionmaking and providing some basic expectations for what ought to enter into consumer choice.
Framing the mortgage choice as one between accepting standard mortgage offers and needing affirmatively to choose nonstandard products should
improve consumer decisionmaking. Creditors will
be required to make heightened disclosures about
the risks of the alternative loan products for the
borrower, subject to legal sanction in the event of
failure to disclose reasonably such risks. The legal
sanctions should deter creditors from making highly unreasonable alternative offers, with hidden and
complicated terms. Consumers may be less likely
to make significant mistakes. The approach would
allow lenders to continue to develop new kinds of
mortgages, but only when they can adequately explain key terms and risks to borrowers.
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Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by required heightened disclosures and
increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to
make high-road lending more profitable in relation
to low-road lending. If offering an opt-out mortgage
product helps to split the market between high- and
low-road firms and rewards the former, the market
may shift (back) toward firms that offer home mortgage products that better serve borrowers. For this
to work effectively, the default and the efforts to
make the default sticky would need to distinguish
the typical good loan (benefiting both lender and
borrower) from a variety of bad loans—e.g., those
that benefit the lender but harm the borrower, those
that benefit the borrower but harm the lender, and
those that harm the borrower and lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an
opt-out home mortgage. For example, the sticky
defaults may not be sticky enough to alter outcomes given market pressures. Implementation of
the measure may be costly and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding enforcement
of the standard might reduce overall access to home
mortgage lending. There may be too many cases in
which alternative products are optimal so that the
default product is in essence incorrect and comes
to be seen as such. The default would then matter less over time; forcing firms and consumers to
go through the process of deviating from it would
become increasingly just another burden (like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road to getting
a home mortgage loan. Low-income, minority, or
first-time homeowners who have benefited from
more-flexible underwriting and more-innovative
mortgage developments might see their access reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not include products suitable to their needs.
One could improve these outcomes in a variety of
ways. For example, the opt-out regulation could
require that the standard set of mortgages include
a thirty-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year
ARM, and straightforward mortgages designed to
meet the particular needs of first-time, minority,
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or low-income homeowners. One might develop
smart defaults based on key borrower characteristics such as income and age. With a handful of key
facts, an optimal default might be offered to an individual borrower. The optimal default would consist
of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely
align with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower with that income and age would prefer. For
example, a borrower with rising income prospects
might appropriately be offered a five-year ARM.
Smart defaults might reduce error costs associated
with the proposal and increase the range of mortgages that can be developed to meet the needs of a
broad range of borrowers, including lower-income
or first-time homeowners. Smart defaults may add
to consumer confusion, however, when too many
choice options exist across the market. Moreover, it
may be difficult to design smart defaults consistent
with fair lending rules.
Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to reduce enforcement costs
over time would be to build in banking agency
supervision as well as periodic required reviews of
the defaults, with consumer experimental design or
survey research to test the disclosures so that the
opt-out product stays current with updated knowledge of outcomes in the home mortgage market.
Indeed, lenders might be required to conduct such
research and to disclose the results to regulators and
the public on developing a new product disclosure.
Regulators might use the results of the research to
provide safe harbors for disclosures that are shown
to be reasonable ex ante through these methods.
Regulators also could issue “no action” letters—
stating agency policy not to take enforcement action against firms—regarding disclosures that are
deemed through such research to be reasonable.
The appropriate federal and state supervisory agencies could be required to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of compliance with the opt-out
regulations and disclosure requirements. The federal and state banking agencies could easily adapt
to this additional role with respect to depositories,
while the FTC, a new expert agency, or state agencies would need to be provided with the author-
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ity and resources to conduct ongoing supervisory
and testing functions for nondepositories instead
of relying solely on enforcement actions. Through
these “no action” letters, safe harbors, supervision,
and other regulatory guidance, the regulators could
develop a body of law that would increase compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved in
mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty
facing lenders from the new opt-out requirement
and providing greater freedom for financial innovation.
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5. Conclusions

W

e have explored how existing regulation fails to take account of advances in
behavioral research about how people
think and act. By contrast, behaviorally informed
regulation would take account of the importance
of framing and defaults, of the gap between information and understanding and between intention
and action, as well as of other psychological factors affecting how people behave. At the same time,
we argue, behaviorally informed regulation should
take into account not only behavioral insights about
individuals, but also economic insights about markets. Markets can be shown to systematically favor
overcoming behavioral biases in some contexts and
to systematically favor exploiting those biases in
other contexts. A central illustration of this distinction is the contrast between the market for saving
and the market for borrowing—in which the same
human failing in understanding and acting on the
concept of compound interest leads to opposite
market reactions.
We have developed a model in which outcomes
are an equilibrium interaction between individuals
with specific psychologies and firms that respond to
those psychologies within specific markets. To the
extent that outcomes in this equilibrium contain
serious social welfare failures, regulation could potentially play a useful role. Taking both individuals

and industrial organization seriously suggests the
need for a range of market-context specific policy
options, including changing both the rules of the
game and its scoring. It is noteworthy that our current framework largely retains the classical perspective of consumers interacting in competitive
markets. The difference is that consumers are now
presumed to be fallible in systematic and important
ways that require insightful regulation to restore
fair and healthy competition.
We have sketched here one policy suggestion derived from our conceptual model.17 In particular,
in the home mortgage market we have focused
on a new, opt-out home mortgage system. Under
the proposal, borrowers would be offered a standard set of mortgages with sound underwriting and
straightforward terms—and that is the mortgage
they would receive, unless they opted out. An optout system would mean borrowers would be more
likely to receive appropriate loans without blocking
beneficial financial innovation. At the same time,
market forces may work against the standard offerings. Thus, we have suggested several alternative
enforcement mechanisms for making the default
sticky enough to influence the market. Further
work will be required to explore which of these
alternative enforcement approaches might merit
enactment.

17.	We explore a range of such policy options in forthcoming work undertaken for the New America Foundation.
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